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COVERAGE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES BY A
LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY
I. INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages have become an accepted mechanism
of modern jurisprudence. Insurance is a necessity of modern
life. When the two become interwoven the result is anything
but predictable. In attempting to unravel the confusion many
legal concepts are encountered: those relating to insurance,
punitive damages, public policy and their inter-dependence.
A look at these diverse considerations should clearly show
the problems that arise. It is hoped this note can suggest
what solutions will be the fairest to all concerned.
II. THE PRESENT STATUS OF INSURANCE COVERAGE
The argument against insurance coverage of punitive
damages has been based on a concept of public policy.' One
such case where coverage was denied found the court
confronted with double and treble damages which, although
similar to, are not synonymous with the punitive or exemplary
award; the former being vitally linked to a criminal
violation .2
The most recent case to deny the recovery of punitive
damages was Northwestern National Casualty Company v.
McNulty.3 This decision was based largely on public policy
as well as the state law of Florida which construes punitive
damages as being a punishment and a deterrent.4 This
interpretation the court integrated into their public policy
argument:
Where a person is able to insure himself against
punishment he gains a freedom of misconduct in-
1. Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934).
2. Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941). It
should be noted that Connecticut considers punitive damages as compen-
satory in effect; see note 19, Infra.
3. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
4. Dr. P. Phillips & Sons, Inc. v. Kilgore, 152 Fla. 578, 12 So. 2d 465
(1943) Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So.
631 (1933).
consistent with the establishment of sanctions against
such misconduct. It is not disputed that insurance
against criminal fines or penalties would be void as
violative of public policy. The same public policy
should invalidate any contract of insurance against the
civil punishment that punitive damages represent.5
There are decisions constituting the majority of case law
which support the contrary view. Liability policies often
recite their coverage limits as the liability imposed by law
6
or arising out of an accident.7 The policy seldom says more
than this in respect to its limits. In one recent case, where
compensatory and punitive damages were awarded in one
undivided sum, the decision supported the coverage of all
damages assessed . Part of their convincing argument was
as follows:
Negligent conduct may be so gross as to merit
characterization as willful and wanton in the sense of
the rule for punitive damages, yet fall far short of an
assault and battery which would distinguish it from an
accidental event and withdraw it from the coverage of
the policy. . . . To allow the appellant's argument
would lead to the illogical and indefensible result,
contrary to the purpose and spirit of liability insurance
policies, which are designed to protect members of the
public, that the more extreme the recklessness the
more likely the insurer would be able to escape
liability,.
9
Several cases hold that since punitive damages are im-
posed by law and the policy covers liability imposed by law
the only fair result is that punitive damages be held within
the scope of the policy. 10 A few of these cases have had
qualifying circumstances; such as a master-servant relation-
ship1 or the insured's obligations being statutory.' 2 In Ohio
State Casualty Insurance Company v. Welfare Finance Co. the
5. Supra note 3 at 440.
6. General Cas. Co. v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956); Am. Fid.
& Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 231 Ala. 285, 164 So. 383 (1935); Morrell v. Ialonde, 45
R.I. 112, 120 Atl. 435 (1923).
7. Penn. R & F. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir.
1957): Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co. 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934).
8. Penn. T. & F. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, supra note 7.
9. 1d. at 827.
10. Supra note 6.
11. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., supra note 7.
12. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, supra note 6.
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court said the insurance coverage was not contrary to public
policy.'" Elaborating on the point, the court declared:
Since this policy clearly covers bodily damage
through negligence and since these punitive damages
are imposed because of the aggravated circumstances
or form of this negligence, such punitive damages
must be regarded as coming within the meaning of
the policy.
14
With limited authority on the precise question involved,
an analysis of the numerous problems entailed is necessary.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
First one must closely examine the concept, meaning,
and acceptance of punitive damages. 15 Here arises the first
of many ambiguities. The great majority of states view
punitive damages as penal or a form of punishment. 6 The
theory is that their infliction will serve as an example and
deter future wrongdoers from similar types of action.1
7
Not all states view punitive damages solely as punish-
ment. Oregon has construed punitive damages as serving the
dual role of both compensation and punishment."8 Most
pronounced is the stand of Connecticut where the courts hold
that what are called punitive damages in effect are compensa-
tory.' 9 They limit the amount of a "punitive" award to the
plaintiff's expenses of litigation in the suit, less his taxable
costs. 20  Michigan"21 and New Hampshire"22 also seem to hold
punitive damages to be compensatory in effect.
A few states have curtailed litigation on the point by not
13. 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1938).
14. Id. at 59.
15. A summary of jurisdictional acceptance and theory of punitive
damages can be found in OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PRO-
PERTY, § 269 (1961).
16. Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952); Dixon v. Bertrum, 258
S.W.2d 24 (Mo. 1953); For an analysis of statutory interpretations see notes
27 and 28, Infra.
17. Polk v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 351 Mo. 865, 174 S.W.2d
176 (1943); Sanders v. Rolnick, 188 Misc. 627, 67 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1947).
18. Kinzua Lumber Co. v. Daggett, 203 Ore. 585, 281 P.2d 221 (1955).
19. Chykirda v. Yanush, 131 Conn. 565, 41 A.2d 449 (1945); Armstron
v. Dolge, 130 Conn. 516, 36 A.2d 24 (1944); Hanna v. Sweeney, 78 Conn. 492.
62 Atl. 785 (1906).
20. Suprit note 19.
21. Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.WA. 746 (1922).
22. Blruton v. Leavitt Stores Corp., 87 N.H. 304, 179 Atl. 185 (1935).
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allowing punitive damages. A Federal decision based on
Illinois law refused to allow an equity court to assess
punitive damages without express statutory provision.
2 3
Massachusetts by statute does not allow the awarding of
punitive, vindictive, or exemplary damages in designated
areas. 24 Washington does not allow the awarding of punitive
damages except by express statutory provision. 25 Nebraska
absolutely forbids the awarding of any damages not com-
pensatory and has declared that awarding any damage in the
form of a fine or penalty w ould be unconstitutional.2 6 Even
where punitive damages are unavailable it can be fairly
presumed that the jury will vary its "compensatory" award
in proportion to the gravity and carelessness exhibited in
relation to the act giving rise to the litigation.
The question then arises as to what type of conduct will
result in an award of punitive damages. North Dakota has
a clear and liberal statute on exemplary damages, setting
out when such an award can be made and its purpose. It
reads as follows:
When jury may give exemplary damages. - In
any action for the breach of an obligation not arising
from contract, when the defendant has been guilty
of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed,
the jury in addition to the actual damages, may give
damages for the sake of example and by way of
punishing the defendant.
27
Other state statutes pertaining to punitive or exemplary
damages are also revealing..2 8 Based on these statutes and
on case law there are many situations involving much less
than an intentional act where punitive damages are allowed.
A jury may infer malice and award exemplary damages.
23. Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 2 F.2d 473 (N.D. Ill. 1924).
24. Not allowed under Massachusetts law in action of libel or slander,
M.G.L.A. c. 231 § 93 (1958); O'Reilly v. Curtis Pub. Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D.C.
Mass. 1940); Also not allowed in Massachusetts in any action of tort against
.un executor or administrator, M.G.L.A. c. 230 § 2 (1958).
25. Wilson v. Sun Pub. Co., 85 Wash. 503, 148 Pac. 774 (1915).
26. Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684 (1960); Wilfong v.
Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry. Co., 129 Neb. 600, 262 N.W. 537 (1935); Riewe
v. McCormick, 11 Neb. 261, 9 N.W. 88 (1881).
27. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03-07 (1961).
28. Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 (1954); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-2-2 (1953); S.D.
Code § 37.1902 (1960 Supp.).
29. Mahanna v. Westland Oil Co., 107 N.W.2d 353 (N.D. 1960); McCurdy
v. Hughes, 63 N.D. 435, 248 N.W. 512 (1933).
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Other cases have held that punitive damages will be awarded
for mere wanton or reckless disregard of the rights of
others, 30 and that malice is not a necessary element of the
act in question.
3 1
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE
CONCEPT TO INSURANCE COVERAGE
In relating punitive damages to the typical insurance
contract the difficulties are apparent. Liability insurance will
not allow coverage for injuries caused wilfully and intentional-
ly. This is an express clause in many policies; if not, then
statutes, courts, and public policy demand that such be the
law.
32
With many punitive awards involving accident liability
policies, another question that comes to mind is whether the
term "accident" encompasses an action for which punitive
damages may be granted. There is both a liberal and a
strict view as to what constitutes an accident. The cases
representing the majority state, in essence, that the term
accident is a more comprehensive term than negligence.
3 3
rhe word accident does not negate the existence of negli-
gence on the part of the person who brought about the event.
3 4
This was aptly stated by the court in Beaumont, S.L. & W.
Ry. Co. v. Schmidt:
While the word "accident" is often used in the
law of negligence as meaning the happening of an
event without fault or neglect on the part of anyone,
in its ordinary meaning it does not negative the idea
of negligence on the part of the person whose act
brought about the event.
35
30. Coryell v. Lawson, 25 Colo. App. 432, 139 Pac. 25 (1914); Lindquist
v. Friedman's Inc., 366 Il. 232, 8 N.E.2d 625 (1937).
31. Carlson v. McNeill, 144 Colo. 78, 162 P.2d 226 (1945).
32. Cal. Ins. Code § 533 (1955); N.D. Cent. Code § 26-06-04 (1961) pro-
vides: "An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilfull act of the
insured, but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured or of
his agents or others."; Weis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 242 Minn.
141, 64 N.W.2d 366 (1954).
33. Sheehan v. Goriansky, 321 Mass. 200, 72 N.E.2d 538 (1947); Roth-
man v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. 134 Ohio 241, 16 N.E.2d 417 (1938); See
Peterson v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 5 Wis. 2d 535, 93 N.W.2d 433 (1958).
34. Bundy Tubing Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 298 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1962);
Globe Indem. Co. of New York v. Banner Grain Co., 90 F.2d 774 (8th Cir.
1937).
35. 123 Tex. Rep. 580, 72 S.AAV.2d 899, 903 (1934).
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It has been held that a harm constructively intentional
falls within the category of an injury "caused by accident.- 3
6
The strict minority view as to what constitutes an accident
is simply that that the term excludes any act in which
negligence is found.
37
If the insurance policy covers accidents, and punitive
damages can be awarded for what in law is deemed an
accident, can the insurer then deny coverage? As already
discussed, many policies cover the liability imposed by law.
Here again, the average insured would reasonably assume
that the total sum of the liability imposed by the court and
jury would be fully covered by his policy.
V. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY
Textual material on this point would seem to conclude
that there should not be coverage of punitive damages under
a liability insurance policy.38 Professor Oleck, in his treatise
on damages, takes a similar position.3 9 Public policy is the
frame within which these conclusions are reached.4 °
What is public policy? It is an obvious supposition that
the concept is variable. A precise definition is difficult, if
not impossible. Generally, it means that nothing can be done
that is injurious to the public or against the public good."'
An act against public policy is one that a good citizen would
deem an imposition on his personal rights and interests,
whether concerned with personal liberty or private property. 4
2
Courts may declare rules of public policy; when they do
their decisions will become part of the law. These decla-
rations should not be based on mere whim, fancy, or personal
prejudice; they should view history, the constitution of the
jurisdiction, existing legislative declarations and judicial
36. Sheehan v. Goriansky, supra note 33 at 542.
37. Morrow v. Southeastern Stages, 68 Ga. ADp. 142, 22 S.E.2d 336 (1942);
Richter v. Atlantic Co., 65 Ga. App. 605, 16 S.E.2d 259 (1941).
38. Comment, Insurance: Liability Insurance: Recovery of Punitive
Damages, 14 Okla, L. Rev. 220 (1961); Note, Insurance Coverage and the
Punitive Award in the Automobile Accident Suit, 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 144
(1957); Note Punitive Damages and Their Possible Application in Auto-
mobile Aecdent Litigation, 46 Va. L. Rev. 1036 (1960).
39. OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY, § 275c (1961).
40. Supra notes 38 and 39.
41. Schulte v. Missionaries of La Salette Corp of Mo., 352 S.W.2d 636
(Mo. 1961).
42. Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n., 41 Cal. 2d 567, 261 P.2d
721 (1953).
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precedent.4 3 In the field of contracts, which includes insur-
ance policies, public detriment will not be inferred where
nothing sinister or improper is done or contemplated.4 4  The
violation of public policy must be apparent from the face of
the contract itself.4 5 Courts will not restrict a contract on




VI. AMBIGUITY OF POLICY TERMS
Conceding that a proper construction of a liability policy
might indicate public detriment by including punitive dam-
ages within its coverage, there is still another argument in
favor of the insured. Insurance law has long recognized that
any ambiguity in the policy will be strictly construed against
the insurer.4 7  If the policy will support an interpretation
imposing liability, such construction will be adopted.
48
Liberal rather than narrow and unreasonable interpre-
tations of clauses in an insurance policy are favored.
49
Rothman v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. stated that where
insurance is against loss resulting from an accident any
limitations or exceptions to policy coverage should be contain-
ed in the policy. ', Another settled rule of law is that where
the language is plain and clear no construction or interpre-
tation is permissible.5 1
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is true that in most states punitive damages are
expressly intended as punishment. A sound argument can
43. Landgraver v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Dd., 203 Ore. 489, 280 P.2d
"01 (1955).
44. Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199 (1927); Allman v. Vinkelman, 106
1..2d 663 (9th Cir. 1939).
45. Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353 (1931).
46. 1Vick v. Patterson, 158 Cal. Apo. 2d 414, 332 P.2d 548 (1958); Mary-
land Cas. Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 71 Cal. App. 492, 236 Pac. 210 (1925).
47. McNally v. American States Ins. Co., 308 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1962);
Jones v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 115 So. 2d 630 (La. 1959): Universal
IUnderwriters Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 110 N.W.2d 224 (N.D. 1961); Conklin v.
North American Life & Cas. Co., 88 N.W.2d 825 (N.D. 1958).
48. McMaster v. New York Life Ins. Co., 183 U.S. 25 (1901); Schinitt v.
lPa ramount Fire Ins. Co., 92 N.W.2d 177 (N.D. 1958).
49. Stipich v. Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311 (1'928).
50. 134 Ohio St. 241, 16 N.E.2d 417 (1938).
5t. Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 284 U.S. 489 (1932); Roth v. West-
in Assur. Co., 308 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1962).
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be made that all insured citizens should not be forced to pay
higher premiums on their policies to allow insurance coverage
of the statutory punishments imposed upon their fellowmen.
However, it has been shown how ambiguous the concept of
punitive damages is in relation to its definitions, purposes,
and applications. When insurance covers an accident or
simply the liability imposed by law and no more detail is set
out, is the insured expected to become a legal scholar and
know precisely what is meant?
The purpose of indemnity insurance is to protect the
insured. Public policy accepts the liability insurance theory.
To restrict coverage whenever serious fault is shown would
shatter the concept on which indemnity insurance is found-
ed.5 2 To withhold coverage wherever there is negligence
would result in coverage only where there is no possible
liability.
The basic question presented as to the coverage of
punitive damages is a difficult one to answer. Public policy
actually can claim arguments, both pro and con, which of
themselves reach a standoff. The two propositions are:
1) punitive damages are intended as punishment and should
be personal to the party at fault; and 2) wherever there are
questions as to coverage the policy will be strictly construed
in favor of the insured. Ambiguities always present them-
selves in respect to the coverage at issue. With that much
granted, why not hold the insurer to some responsibility by
requiring him to expressly exclude damages not deemed
compensatory or damages and liability imposed as punish-
ment! Appleman, the acknowledged expert in the insurance
field, supports coverage of punitive damages. 53 He also
believes insurers would lose policies if they purposely exclud-
ed such coverage.5 4 Actually, it seems hard to believe that
the average citizen would prefer no insurance to having
insurance for compensatory damages. Insurers can educate
the public to reasons for withholding coverage of punitive or
exemplary awards. It would seem to be their duty to so act
52. Messersmith v. American Fid. Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 133, N.E. 432 (1921
This case presents a stimulating analysis of indemnity and liability in-
surance by Justice Cardozo.
53. 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE§ 4312 (1962).
54. Id., at p. 137.
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if they believe the coverage should be limited to compensatory
awards. Without such an express limitation by insurers, the
doubt arising as to the policy coverage must be resolved
against them!
To say there should be coverage is slighting bona fide
interests and to say there should not be coverage is likewise
being blind to a variety of considerations. It is submitted
that it would truly be fair to hold the responsibility to the
insurers and, if they fail to meet it, let them pay the full
liability imposed upon their policy holders as a type of
exemplary damage for their own lack of diligence.
R. JON FITZNER
